This paper examines how background risk aects risk taking under rankdependent utility. I assume that a decision-maker facing a risk taking decision in the presence of background risk views these risks as composing a compound lottery, and recursively evaluates this compound lottery using rank-dependent utility. I show that adding background risk increases risk aversion whenever the utility-for-wealth function is risk vulnerable (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) in this model.
Introduction
People who face risky decisions almost invariably have uninsurable pre-existing risks, and empirical work suggests that such pre-existing risks tend to make people more risk averse (Guiso et al., 1996; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Beaud and Willinger, 2015) .
Previous research has provided, under expected utility (EU), necessary and sucient conditions on a a decision-maker's (DM) utility-for-wealth function for the DM to exhibit more risk aversion following a deterioration in background risk (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Eeckhoudt et al., 1996) . This paper provides analogous results for a recursive application of rank-dependent utility (RDU) by showing that these conditions remain sucient under RDU.
It is known that in RDU, a DM's evaluation of risks may depend on how and when they resolve (Segal, 1990) . I assume that a DM who is oered the opportunity to take an additional risk (1) views the additional risk and her background risk as forming a two-stage lottery with her background risk being resolved at the second stage, and (2) evaluates two-stage lotteries recursively (consistent with Segal's compound independence axiom).
1 Theorem 2 shows that if the DM has RDU preferences and her utility-for-wealth is risk vulnerable in the sense of (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) , then she exhibits more risk aversion when faced with an actuarially unfavorable background risk. Theorem 2 provides the analogous result for rst-and second-order stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD) deteriorations in background risk.
My results contrast with those of Quiggin (2003) and Safra and Segal (2008) , who assume that a DM integrates any additional risk and her background risk into a single lottery using the laws of probability (as required by the reduction of compound lotteries axiom) and nd that in RDU and related models, risk aversion due to probability weighting is attenuated by the presence of uninsurable background risk.
1 The modeling approach to risk taking with background risk under recursive non-expected utility builds on Freeman (2015) , who uses this approach to show that many non-expected utility theories, including RRDU, can capture descriptively reasonable small-stakes risk aversion without implying absurd large-stakes risk aversion. See Dillenberger (2010) for another recent application of recursive non-expected utility over multi-stage lotteries.
Model

Preliminaries
The setup follows Freeman (2015) . 
Preferences over compound lotteries
I assume that a DM has RDU (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987) preferences over singlestage lotteries. V : ∆(W ) → R is a rank-dependent utility function if there exist strictly increasing functions and continuous u :
The function g is called a probability weighting function, and is required to satisfy g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1; the function u is called a utility-for-wealth function. Notice that EU corresponds to the special case of RDU in which the probability weighting function is linear. Given an RDU function V , let c denote its corresponding certainty equivalent function dened by c = u
In the analysis that follows, assume that V is risk averse that is, averse to meanpreserving spreads. This is equivalent to assuming that g and u are both weakly concave (Chew et al., 1987 
An normatively-appealing alternative way to apply V to two-stage lotteries is to use the laws of probability to reduce any two-stage lottery Q to a single-stage lottery and apply V to this reduced lottery. 
. This leads to the following denition: a DM reduces compound lotteries if she evaluates the desirability of any two-stage lottery Q according to V (Q R ).
Risk taking with background risk
Dene a gamble as a nite-support lottery over gain and loss prizes (as opposed to wealth levels). Consider a DM with wealth level w who faces background wealth risk described by the gambleq = [y 1 , q 1 ; ...; y m , q m ], which is not the subject of choice. This DM is oered the gamble over prizesp = (y 1 , p 1 ; ...; y n , p n ). Each y i ∈ R is a monetary prize added to or taken away from the DM's nal wealth after lotteryp resolves and each y i ∈ R is similarly a monetary gain or loss similarly added to or taken away from the DM's nal wealth afterq resolves.
2
Letp ⊕q + w denote the two-stage lottery formed by the simple gamble over prizeŝ p, which resolves at the rst stage, and independent background riskq, which resolves at the second stage, given initial wealth w. Whenq has nite support, the two-stage lotteryp ⊕q + w is given bŷ p ⊕q + w = [q + y 1 + w, p 1 ; ...;q + y n + w, p n ]
(1) 2 I assume that background risk resolves after the oered gamble, however, if this order were reversed, it would require only straightforward modications to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
whereq + y i + w = [y 1 + y i + w, q 1 ; ...; y m + y i + w m , q m ] denotes the lottery over nal wealth states that the DM faces if prize y i is won in the gamblep.
Take an RDU certainty equivalent function c and its associated RRDU function U . Consider the following behavioral properties of c. Dene that adding actuarially unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion if for any gamblep ∈ ∆(Y ), any gambleq ∈ ∆(Y ) with a weakly negative expected value, and any admissible w ∈ W , c(p + w) ≤ w implies that U (p ⊕ (w +q)) ≤ V (w +q). Dene that an FSD (SSD) deterioration in background risk increases risk aversion if for any gambleŝ p,q,r ∈ ∆(Y ) for whichq rst-order (second-order) stochastically dominatesr, and any admissible w ∈ W , c(p ⊕q + w) ≤ c(q + w) implies that U (p ⊕r + w)) ≤ V (r + w).
The eect of background risk on risk taking in RRDU
Following Gollier and Pratt (1996) , dene that a utility-for-wealth function u is risk vulnerable if for anyq ∈ ∆(Y ) with a weakly negative expected value and for any w,
Gollier and Pratt (Proposition 1) show that risk vulnerability of u is a necessary and sucient condition for the addition of an unfavorable background risk to increase risk aversion over oered gambles in EU their result is presented as Proposition 1 below. Proposition 1. (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) Under EU, adding an actuarially unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion if and only if u is risk vulnerable.
Theorem 1 shows that if the utility-for-wealth function u is risk vulnerable, then any RRDU function with utility-for-wealth function u and a concave g that evaluates oered gambles according to (1) also has the property that adding unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion. Theorem 1. Suppose U is an RRDU function with a concave probability weighting function g and a concave utility-for-wealth function u. If u is risk vulnerable, then adding an actuarially unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion.
Proof. Suppose U captures a DM's RRDU preferences, with corresponding probability weighting function g and a risk vulnerable utility-for-wealth function u. Let p,q ∈ ∆(Y ) with ydq(y) ≤ 0.
Suppose c turns downp at wealth level w. Then, u(w + y)dg(Fp(y)) < u(w) .
( 2) Since g is a probability weighting function, g•Fp and g•Fq are CDFs corresponding to gambles in ∆(Y ). Equation (2) is equivalent to an EU maximizer with utility-forwealth function u turning down the gamble with CDF g • Fp.
Since ydFq(y) ≤ 0 and g is concave, it follows that ydg(Fq(y)) ≤ ydFq(y) ≤ 0. Thus g • Fq is the CDF of an actuarially unfair gamble.
Since u is risk vulnerable and an EU maximizer with utility-for-wealth function u turns down the gamble with CDF g • Fp at wealth w, by Proposition 1, an EUmaximizer with utility-for-wealth function u, wealth w, and background risk g • Fq also turns downp, that is,
Thus such a DM will also turn downp when she faces actuarially unfavorable background riskq. Since the choices ofp andq were arbitrary, conclude that adding an unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion for an RRDU DM with a risk vulnerable u.
The main step of the proof shows that in this approach to modeling background risk under RRDU, probability weighting is separately applied to the background risk and to the additional risk. Because of this, an RRDU risk taking decision with a given background risk is equivalent to an EU risk taking decision involving transformed risks obtained by applying the RDU probability weighting function. This provides a way to port existing results on the impact of background risk on risk taking in EU to the RRDU model, and I provide two additional results that follow from this insight.
One might notice that in Proposition 1 (from Gollier and Pratt 1996) , risk vulnerability of u is a necessary and sucient condition for adding an unfavorable background risk to increase risk aversion, whereas under RRDU, it is only a sucient condition.
The gap between the two results stems from the fact that for any actuarially unfavorable gamble with CDF F , the transformed gamble g •F is also actuarially unfavorable when g is a concave probability weighting function. Corollary 1 provides the analogous necessary and sucient behavioral condition for u to be risk vulnerable, and
given Proposition 1, follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose U is an RRDU function with a concave probability weighting function g and a concave utility-for-wealth function u. The utility-for-wealth function u is risk vulnerable if and only if adding any background riskq for which ydg(F q (y)) ≤ 0 increases risk aversion.
A remaining question is how these results could be generalized to provide a condition for g and u for which, under RRDU, an increase in background risk, fromq to the riskierr, raises risk aversion. I answer that question for the cases in whichr is related toq by FSD or SSD. Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) provide two conditions that, under EU, they show are necessary and sucient for FSD and SSD deteriorations in background risk to increase risk aversion. Theorem 2 below shows that these conditions on u are also sucient in RRDU.
Theorem 2. Suppose U is an RRDU function with a concave probability weighting function g and a concave utility-for-wealth function u. If there exists a λ ∈ R such that −
, then an FSD deterioration in background risk increases risk aversion. If, in addition, there exists a κ ∈ R such that −
, then an SSD deterioration in background risk increases risk aversion.
Proof. Ifq rst-(second-) order stochastically dominatesr, then g •Fq rst-(second-) order stochastically dominates g • Fr (Chew et al., 1987) . 3 Proposition 2. (Quiggin, 2003) If a DM has RDU preferences with a linear u and she reduces compound lotteries, then adding an actuarially unfavorable background risk reduces risk aversion.
Discussion
The RRDU model here parsimoniously accommodates violations of the independence axiom and reduction of compound lotteries as well as small-stakes risk aversion. Theorem 1 showed that when u is risk vulnerable RRDU is also consistent with evidence that background risk increases risk aversion. Thus the model here provides a tractable and descriptively-motivated way to apply RDU in the presence of background risk that avoids the descriptively problematic predictions that follow under reduction of compound lotteries.
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